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Gigantic Shipbuilders under the IMO Mandate of GHG Emissions:  






To address greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping, the International Maritime 
Organization has adopted technical and operational measures, and discussed the possibility of 
adopting market-based measures. China, Japan and South Korea are major shipbuilding nations 
in the world, and have differing responses towards the IMO’s regulatory initiatives. This paper 
conducts a comparative assessment of these three countries’ positions on regulatory principles of 
the greenhouse gas issue, and concludes that their differentiated perspectives on this matter reflect 
their different regulatory interests. It is significant to take their differentiated interests into 
account in the developing regulatory regime to avoid disproportionate burdens being placed on 
certain countries, in particular developing countries.  
 
Keywords 






Climate change is one of the most significant challenges to the mankind of the 21st century. 
This new phenomenon requires “substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas 
emissions” (“GHGs”).1 Climate change is also related to international shipping, the backbone 
of global trade and a driving force of the economic globalisation.2 Although often recognised 
                                                             
∗ Ph.D. candidate at Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of 
Wollongong. M.TCP (Wollongong), LL.M. (Beijing Technology & Business Univ.), B.A. (Beijing Forestry 
Univ.). The author is grateful to Associate Professor Robin Warner and Professor Warwick Gullett for their 
comments on some of the issues covered in this paper. The views expressed in this paper remain the sole 
responsibility of its author. This research was supported by Global Challenges Ph.D. Scholars program of 
University of Wollongong. The author may be contacted at: shiyubing@hotmail.com /Address: ANCORS, 
Innovation Campus, University of Wollongong, NSW 2500 Australia. 
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 'Fifth Assessment Report: Working Group I Report' 
(2013), Summary for Policymakers, 19, available at 
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf (last visited on Oct. 10, 2014).  
2 International shipping generally refers to “shipping between ports of different countries” and excludes military 
and fishing vessels engaged on such voyages. See Øyvind. Buhaug et al., Second IMO GHG Study 2009, 13 
(2009). International shipping carries around 80% of global trade by volume. United Nations Conference on 
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as a relatively environmental sound method of transportation,3 international shipping has 
been reported to have significant and growing influence on climate change.4 Given the 
urgency of emissions reduction and the global nature of the shipping industry, the 
international community has responded to this imperative and begun to develop a regulatory 
framework. 
      The international regulatory efforts in regulating GHG emissions from international 
shipping can be traced back to the year 1995 when the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) 5 ’s Subsidiary Body on Scientific and 
Technological Advice (“SBSTA”) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (“SBI”) were 
requested to examine the allocation and control of emissions from international bunker 
fuels. 6  In 1996, SBSTA identified five options from the eight options provided by the 
UNFCCC Secretariat as the basis for future work on the allocation of emissions from 
aviation and marine bunker fuels.7 In order to include GHG emissions from international 
shipping into a State-based convention, the emissions have to be allocated to different 
countries. However, this approach failed in reaching consensus among States. 8  As a 
consequence, Article 2(2) of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to UNFCCC authorised the 
International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) to regulate the GHG emissions from 
international shipping.9 Since then, two parallel regimes have been contributing to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), Review of Maritime Transport (2013), xi, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2013_en.pdf (last visited on Sept. 28, 2014).  
3 See, e.g., C. Pisani, Fair at Sea: The Design of A Future Legal Instrument on Marine Bunker Fuels Emissions 
within the Climate Change Regime, 33 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 57-76, 57 (2002).  
4 In 2007, CO emissions from international shipping reached 870 million tonnes, which covers 2.7% of the 
global emissions of CO. If left unchecked, CO emissions from international shipping may grow by 150-250% 
by 2050 compared with 2007 due to projected growth in demand for maritime transport service. Buhaug et al, 
supra note 2, at 1.  
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, reported in 31 
I.L.M. 848.  
6 Methodological Issues, Decision 4/CP.1, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, art 1(f), at 
16, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (Apr. 7, 1995).  
7 These five options are: (1) no allocation; (2) allocation to the country where the bunker fuel is sold; (3) 
allocation to the country of the transporting company, the country of registration of registration of the 
aircraft/vessel, or the country of the operator; (4) allocation to the country of departure or destination of the 
aircraft/vessel; and (5) allocation to the country of departure or destination of the passenger/cargo. See S. 
Oberthür, Institutional Interaction to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Transport: ICAO, 
IMO and the Kyoto Protocol, 3 Climate Pol’y 191-205, 193 (2003).  
8 Id.  
9 Article 2(2) of the Kyoto protocol provides that: “The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or 
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine 
bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime 
Organization, respectively.” Kyoto Protocol, art 2(2), Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, reported in 37 I.L.M. 
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international regulatory process of this GHG issue. 
         The first regime is based on the global climate change where SBSTA worked on marine 
bunker fuels in 1996, which afterwards has been collaborated with the IMO. The Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (“AWG-LCA”) under UNFCCC had 
been working on the issue of international bunker fuels before 2012.10 Without substantial 
outcomes on GHG emissions issue, the AWG-LCA finalized its work in 2012 Doha Climate 
Change Conference as mandated. Currently the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action (“ADP”) is working on negotiating a global climate change 
agreement that will be adopted by 2015 and will enter into force from 2020. Nevertheless, 
whether or to what extent that the 2015 climate change agreement will involve GHG 
emissions from international shipping remains unclear. 
      The second regime is related to the IMO GHG emissions where the IMO has adopted 
relevant conventions, codes, resolutions and guidelines to regulate GHG emissions issue. Of 
these various regulative initiatives, Resolution 811 and Resolution A.963 (23)12 were adopted 
by the IMO in 1997 and 2003, respectively, which have underpinned the subsequent actions 
of the IMO. To date, three categories of measures have been discussed within the 
Organization in order to address GHG emissions from ships, namely technical measures, 
operational measures, and market-based measures (“MBMs”).13 After lengthy deadlock of 
negotiations on shipping GHG emissions within the IMO, shipping GHG emissions were 
partially regulated by technical and operational measures on July 15, 2011. This regulation 
takes the form of amended Annex VI to the International Convention for the Prevention of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
22. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol only listed six types of GHGs, namely CO, CH, NO, HFCs, PFCs and SF, but 
a seventh type of GHG, NF was added to the category in the Durban Climate Change Conference in 2011. The 
GHG emissions from international shipping mainly constitute CO, CH, NO and HFC. See Outcome of the 
Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at 
its Sixteenth Session, Decision 1/CMP.7, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Seventh Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012),  available 
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf (last visited on Oct. 10, 2014). 
10 AWG-LCA discussed the issue of international bunker fuels under paragraph 1b(iv) of the Bali Action Plan. 
Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008).  
11 Resolution 8 on ‘CO emissions from ships’ requests the IMO to undertake a study on GHG emissions from 
ships and consider feasible CO  reduction strategies. IMO, Main Events in IMO's Work on Limitation and 
Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping (2011), ¶para 12, available at 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/resources/Pages/Greenhouse%20gas%20emissions.aspx (last visited on Sept. 
28, 2014).  
12  IMO Policies and Practices Related to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships, IMO 
Assembly 23rd Session, Agenda Item 19, IMO Doc Res A.963(23) (Dec. 5, 2003) (IMO Resolution A.963(23)).  
13 IMO, supra note 11, at ¶50.  
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Pollution from Ships (hereinafter MARPOL 73/78).14 By adding a new Chapter 4 to Annex VI 
on the regulation on energy efficiency for ships, this amendment makes mandatory the 
Energy Efficiency Design Index (“EEDI”) for new ships,15 and the Ship Energy Efficiency 
Management Plan (“SEEMP”) for all ships.16 As this regulation was adopted by a majority 
vote rather than consensus, it is predicted that the future enforcement of this regulation will 
face certain challenges and uncertainties.17 To date seven types of MBM proposals, 18 which 
aim to complement the technical and operational measures in reducing shipping GHG 
emissions,19 have been submitted to the IMO for discussions.  
China, Japan, and South Korea are main flag States and shipping nations of the world. In 
particular, the shares of the global shipbuilding order book (in Gross Tonnage) by these 
three countries accounted for 88.49% in 2012.20 Therefore, the responses of these three 
                                                             
14 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 
U.N.T.S. 61, reported in 12 I.L.M. 1319, as amended by the 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention, 1341 UNTS 
3, 17, reported in I.L.M. 546. To date, MARPOL 73/78 has adopted 6 annexes and their revisions, and Annex VI 
(Air Pollution from Ships) entered into force on May 19, 2005. See Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI and the 
NO
 Technical Code 2008, IMO Doc Res MEPC.251(66) (Apr. 4, 2014).  
15 As the main technical measure, the EEDI provides a specific figure representing a minimum energy efficiency 
level or technological threshold for certain ship types and size segments. Ship designers and shipbuilders are 
free to choose the most cost-efficient technological solutions for the ship once the minimum energy efficiency 
level required by the EEDI is achieved. IMO, supra note 11, at ¶57. 
16 The SEEMP is an operational measure. As a ship-specific energy management plan, the SEEMP provides a 
flexible mechanism for shipowners and ship operators to monitor ship and fleet efficiency performance over 
time in a cost-effective manner. The Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI) is often utilized as a 
monitoring tool and to establish benchmarks related to ships’ energy efficiency. Id. at 59. 
17 See, e.g., James Harrison, Recent Developments and Continuing Challenges in the Regulation of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions from International Shipping (2012), 2, University of Edinburgh Research Paper Series, available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037038 (last visited Oct. 2, 2013); Md. Saiful Karim, IMO Mndatory Eergy 
Efficiency Measures for International Shipping: The First Mantory Global Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Instrument for an International Industry, 7 MACQ. J. INT’L & COMP. ENVTL. L. 113 (2011).  
18 These seven types of MBM proposals are International GHG Fund, port State levy, Efficiency Incentive 
Scheme (EIS), Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading (SECT), Global Emissions Trading System (ETS) for 
international shipping, Penalty on Trade and Development, and Rebate Mechanism (RM). Among them, the 
SECT and Penalty on Trade and Development have been modified to be strengthened technical and operational 
measures. However, as options for possible MBMs, these two MBM proposals are still on the table. See Further 
Details on the US Proposal to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping, submitted by the 
United States, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 61/INF.24 (Jul 23, 2010); How Technical 
and Operational Measures are the Only Direct and Effective Means to Deliver Cuts in C  Emissions, 
submitted by the Bahamas, Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on GHG Emissions from Ships 3rd 
Session, Agenda Item 2, IMO Doc GHG-WG 3/2 (Dec. 22, 2010). 
19 Recent research indicates that to achieve absolute emissions reduction using the EEDI and SEEMP alone is 
not possible due to the projected growth in international seaborne trade. See Z. Bazari & T. Longva, Assessment 
of IMO Mandated Energy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping8, IMO Doc MEPC 63/INF.2, 
annex( Oct. 31, 2011).  
20 Council Working Party on Shipbuilding, Peer Review of Japanese Government Support Measures to the 
Shipbuilding Sector (2013), 29, available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/C-WP6%282012%2926-FINAL-
ENG.pdf (last visited on Oct. 2, 2014).  
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countries to the IMO’s regulatory initiatives, in particular the applicable regulatory 
principles, to a significant extent determine whether these measures could be effectively 
enforced by global shipping industries, and are thus worthy of an assessment. Different from 
China and Japan who are widely accepted as a developing and a developed country 
respectively, the status of South Korea is a bit ambiguous; she has been regarded as a 
developed country by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) and other international organisations.21 However, South Korea is also a UNFCCC 
non-Annex I State; it means she has been identified as a developing country under the global 
climate change regime. For these reasons the views of Korean Government, as well as its 
shipping industry, on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships are different from those of 
Japan. In this sense, China, Japan, and South Korea represent a major developing country, a 
typical developed country, and a developed but treated as a developing country respectively. 
A comparative assessment of these three countries’ perspectives on GHG emissions from 
ships can reflect the positions of many other developing countries and developed countries.  
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine and compare the perspectives of China, 
Japan, and South Korea on regulatory principles of GHG emissions from international 
shipping. These countries’ positions on the IMO’s mandate and competence to regulate GHG 
emissions from ships are also analyzed for their relevance with applicable principles of this 
GHG issue. This article is divided into four parts including Introduction and Conclusion. 
Part two will investigate the shipping industries of China, Japan and Korea. Part three will 
compare the perspectives of those three countries on regulatory principles of GHG 
Emissions from international shipping. 
 
II. The Shipping Industries in China, Japan and South Korea 
 
A. China 
Although China’s first international shipping company was established in 1961, the benign 
development of China’s international shipping sector, as well as its shipbuilding sector, only 
started in 1978 when its reform and opening up policy was adopted.22 China’s shipping 
                                                             
21 See, e.g., Australian Government: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, List of Developing Countries as Declared by 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs (2013), available at http://www.ausaid.gov.au/ngos/Documents/list-developing-
countries.pdf (last visited on Sept. 28, 2014); American Mathematical Society, Developing Countries List, 
available at http://www.ams.org/membership/individual/types/mem-develop (last visited on Sept. 28, 2014); 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook (2011), 172, available at 
http://www.ioha2012.net/?page_id=1945 (last visited on Sept. 28, 2014).  
22 Gao Weijie, Development Strategy of Chinese Shipping Company under the Multilateral Framework of WTO 
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industry has achieved rapid development after three decades’ development. As of January 1, 
2013, China ranked ninth in the world among the flags of registration with the largest 
registered deadweight tonnage.23 In the same year, China owned the third largest fleet in the 
world with 190,078,835 deadweight tonnages, which covered 11.78% of the world fleet.24 
However, 64.79% of these Chinese owned fleets (in terms of deadweight tonnage) sailed 
under the flags of foreign States. In 2010, China’s shipbuilding sector ranked first in the 
world in three categories, namely, its accomplished shipbuilding output, volume of new ship 




Japan is a traditional maritime power in the world as well as important flag State. As of 
January 1, 2013, Japan ranked 14th in the world among the flags of registration with the 
largest registered deadweight tonnage.26 Meanwhile, Japan owned the second largest fleet in 
the world with 223,815,008 deadweight tonnage, which accounted for 13.87% of the world 
fleet.27 Of these Japanese owned fleets, 92.31% of them (in terms of deadweight tonnage) flew 
the flags of foreign States.28 Japan is one of the most advanced UNFCCC Annex I States and 
has pioneered most energy-efficient shipping technologies. Consequently, although Japan’s 
share of world shipbuilding output has fallen from around 34% in 1999 to 18% in 2011, due to 
worsening global economic conditions,29 Japan is still receiving many international orders for 
building larger and more complicated vessels with more added values. Japan’s shipping 
industry is competitive in the international high-level or energy efficient shipbuilding 
market.30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
(2003), 2, available at http://www.docin.com/p-428858926.html  (last visited on Oct. 10, 2014).  
23 UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 56.  
24 Id. at 41.  
25 Yuzhen Xie et al. 解玉真等, The Impacts of the EEDI on the Chinese Shipbuilding and Shipping Industries 
EEDI对中国造船及航运业的影响 (available only in Chinese) 11 CHINA MARITIME 中国海事 24 (2011).  
26 UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 56.  
27 Id. at 43.  
28 Id.  
29 During this period, China and South Korea both increased their shares of world shipbuilding output and 
reached 39% and 31% respectively. Council Working Party on Shipbuilding, supra note 20, at 23.  
30 Id. at 30.  
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C. South Korea 
 The South Korean shipbuilding sector only began its development in the early 1970s. 
Nevertheless, to date, South Korea has become one of the main shipping nations of the world. 
As of January 1, 2013, South Korea controlled the fifth largest owned fleets (dwt) in the 
world with 764 vessels registered under Korean flags and 812 registered in other flag States.31 
The deadweight tonnage it owned in that year accounted for 4.65% of the world total.32 The 
South Korean shipbuilding sector has ranked first among South Korean exports since 2008,33 
and is now home to seven of the world’s ten largest shipbuilding companies. Among the 
seven top shipbuilders, Hyundai Heavy Industries (“HHI”), Samsung Heavy Industries 
(“SHI”) and Daewoo Shipbuilding (“DSB”), also called the ‘Big 3’, are believed to have 
dominated the global market in terms of output.34  
 
D. Assessment 
Given that China, Japan and South Korea are all important players of international shipping 
trade, these three countries are also competitors in global shipping market, in particular in 
shipbuilding market. With its booming shipbuilding capability, South Korea overtook Japan 
to be the world’s largest shipbuilding nation in 2000, after Japan surpassed its European 
counterparts in 1956. This title was taken over by China in 2010 due to China’s better 
performance in exports of ships, but in 2011 South Korea regained the top spot as global 
shipowners ordered more complex high-technological vessels, in the production of which 
currently South Korea has absolute advantages over China.35 Against this backdrop, China, 
Japan and South Korea have made differentiated responses to the IMO’s regulatory 
initiatives.  
 
III. China, Japan and South Korea’s Perspectives on Regulatory  
Principles of GHG Emissions from International Shipping 
 
It is generally accepted that the varying interpretations of Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol 
                                                             
31 UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 43.  
32 Id.  
33  M. Porter et al, Shipbuilding Cluster in the Republic of Korea (2010), 18, available at 
http://www.docin.com/p-373755421.html  (last visited on Oct. 10, 2014).  
34 Id.  
35 A. Lee, South Korean Shipbuilding Faces Hard Times, Hyundai Heavy Reflects (Feb. 2, 2012), available at 
http://gcaptain.com/south-korean-shipbuilding-faces/ (last visited on Sept. 28, 2014).  
Page 8 of 20 
 
by various countries has been the core obstacle in the regulation of shipping GHG emissions 
by the IMO. In other words, it is still open to debate whether the IMO has a mandate from 
the Kyoto Protocol to regulate the GHG issue.36 This discussion is significant in the sense 
that the generally-accepted origin of the IMO’s GHG mandate determines what kind of 
regulatory principles and measures apply to the regulation of this GHG issue.37 Generally 
speaking, if an international treaty gives the IMO a mandate, the principles incorporated into 
the treaty should also apply to the IMO’s regulation of the GHG issue.38 Therefore, if the 
IMO gets its mandate to regulate GHG emissions from international shipping from the 
Kyoto Protocol, the Common but Differentiated Responsibility (“CBDR”) principle39 which 
runs through the Kyoto Protocol40 should apply to GHG emissions reductions from ships. 
Similarly, if the Convention on the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter IMO 
Convention) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”)41 give 
the IMO this GHG mandate, the No More Favourable Treatment (“NMFT”) principle,42 
which has been consistently incorporated by all IMO agreements, should apply to this issue. 
Meanwhile, once the origin of the IMO’s GHG mandate is agreed, the measures beyond the 
IMO’s competence should not be adopted by the IMO to regulate this GHG issue. 
                                                             
36 There are two views contributing to this debate. One view is that the IMO’s mandate to regulate GHG 
emissions from ships is solely from the Kyoto Protocol. See, e.g., A. Miola, M. Marra and B. Ciuffo, Designing 
A Climate Change Policy for the International Maritime Transport Sector: Market-Based Measures and 
Technological Options for Global and Regional Policy Actions, 39(9) Energy Pol’y 5492 (2011); Jodie Moffat, 
Arranging Deckchairs on the Titanic: Climate Change, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and International Shipping, 
24(2) A&NZ Mar L.J. 104-125, 105 (2010). The other view attributes the IMO’s mandate in regulating GHG 
emissions from ships to the IMO Convention, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Law, and IMO 
Resolution 8. See, e.g., Md. Saiful Karim and Shawkat Alam, Climate Change and Reduction of Emissions of 
Greenhouse Gases from Ships: An Appraisal, 1(1) Asian J. Int’l L. 131-148, 147-148 (2011); Oberthür, supra 
note 7, at 195.  
37 Yubing Shi, Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping: The Response from China’s Shipping 
Industry to the Regulatory Initiatives of the International Maritime Organization, 29 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 
77-115, 82 (2014).  
38 Id. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 31, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679; Convention on the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, art 41, Mar. 6, 1948, 289 U.N.T.S. 3, amended and renamed 
as Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Nov. 14, 1975, 9 U.T.S. 61 (‘IMO Convention’).  
39 The CBDR principle requires both developed and developing States to contribute to addressing environmental 
problems, but imposes the primary responsibility on developed States due to their different historical 
contribution to the problems and the differentiated capability of developed and developing States. This principle 
was first explicitly formulated in Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and 
has been widely accepted and endorsed in many conventions and treaties, including the UNFCCC and its Kyoto 
Protocol. See Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law 287 (Cambridge University Press, 
2nd ed, 2003).  
40 Kyoto Protocol art 10.  
41 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (‘UNCLOS’). 
42 The NMFT principle refers to ‘port States enforcing applicable standards in a uniform manner to all ships in 
their ports, regardless of flag’. Buhaug et al, supra note 2, at 20. See also MARPOL 73/78 art 5(4).  
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Alternatively, the IMO may collaborate with other competent international organisations in 
adopting these measures.43 China, Japan and South Korea have expressed their positions and 
provided theoretical analysis to underpin their arguments due to the significance of the 
IMO’s mandate issue. 
 
A. China’s Perspective 
China has expressed its views on this GHG issue by submitting a number of proposals and 
statements to the IMO since the 52nd Marine Environment Protection Committee (“MEPC”) 
meeting in 2004.44 Through submitting these documents, China has attempted to address 
three concerns such as: (1) what is the scope of the IMO’s mandate and competence in 
regulating the GHG issue?; (2) why the CBDR principle should be applied to the GHG issue?; 
and (3) how the CBDR principle could be applied to this issue?45 
         China took the view that the scope of the IMO’s competence in regulating the GHG 
issue should be limited to technology or methodology related matters,46 and the proposed 
MBMs under discussion are beyond the competence of the IMO.47 Supporting the IMO to 
regulating technical issues, however, China thus asserted that MBMs should be decided by 
the UNFCCC if they are to be regulated in the future.48 Although this view has been 
supported by a number of developing countries,49 China did not provide legal basis for its 
assertion in its submitted documents. Indeed, the IMO Convention provides the 
                                                             
43 Shi, supra note 37.  
44 The MEPC is responsible for the regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping. IMO Convention 
arts 11, 38; IMO Resolution A.963(23) art 1.  
45 See, e.g., Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 59th Session, 2, Statement by the 
Delegation of China on GHG Issues, IMO Doc MEPC 59/24/Add.1 Annex 13 (2009); Application of the 
Principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Shipping, para 5, submitted by China and India, MEPC 58th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc 
MEPC 58/4/32 (Aug. 15, 2008); Comments on the Proposed Mandatory Energy Efficiency Regulations, para 14, 
submitted by China, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 
62/5/10 (May 5, 2011).  
46 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Sixth Session, para 4.58, MEPC 56th 
Session, Agenda Item 23, IMO Doc MEPC 56/23 (Jul. 30, 2007); Report of the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee on its 59
th
 Session, 2, Statement by the Delegation of China on GHG Issues, IMO Doc MEPC 
59/24/Add.1 Annex 13 (2009).  
47 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, annex 4, p 2, MEPC 60th 
Session, Agenda Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 60/22 (Apr. 12, 2010).  
48 Id.  
49  For example, this view was also held by Brazil, Venezuela and Malaysia. See Report of the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, annex 3, pp 5-7, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda 
Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 61/24 (Oct. 6, 2010).  
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Organization with economic purpose.50 However, in practice the purposes of the IMO have 
been limited to technical aspects only,51 and its economic mandate has never been allowed to 
be exercised.52 Meanwhile, China and its shipping industry are opposed to any unilateral 
actions, in particular, the proposed inclusion of GHG emissions from international shipping 
into a European Union Emission Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”).53 
      China has put forward five reasons to underpin the application of the CBDR principle to 
GHG emissions from international shipping. First, the IMO received its mandate to regulate 
the GHG issue from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol; this is also the only mandate in 
regulating the GHG issue.54 Therefore, the fundamental principles that UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol have set for regulating climate change, including the CBDR principle, should 
also apply to the IMO in addressing GHG emissions from international shipping.55  
      Second, the CBDR principle is not just the principle drawn from UNFCCC and its Kyoto 
Protocol; it rather represents the fundamental consensus of the international community in 
tackling climate change.56 Thus, all relevant international organizations should give due 
respect to the CBDR principle when they contribute to addressing climate change. The IMO 
is no exception.57  
        Third, the IMO Assembly rejected a recommendation that Resolution A.963 (23) on the 
reduction of GHG emissions from ships “should be based on a common policy applicable to 
all ships rather than based on the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol” in 2003.58 China is 
opined that the above assertion by MEPC was proved ‘wrong.’ The IMO’s Legal Division 
interpreted that its GHG mandate was not from Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol, but from 
the UNCLOS and the IMO Convention.59 However, China argued that Article 2(2) shall only 
                                                             
50 IMO Convention art 1(b)(c).  
51 G. P. Pamborides, International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement 83 (1999).  
52 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Vessel-source Marine Pollution: the Law and Politics of International Regulation 75 
(2006).  
53 Shi, supra note 37, at 112.  
54 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 59th Session, 1, Statement by the Delegation of 
China on GHG Issues, IMO Doc MEPC 59/24/Add.1 Annex 13 (2009).  
55 Id.; Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (Oct. 
16, 2008).  
56  Report of the Outcome of the First Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Ships, annex 4, p 3, MEPC 58th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4 (Jul. 4, 2008).  
57 Id.  
58 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Second Session, para 4.44, MEPC 52nd 
Session, Agenda Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 52/24 (Oct. 18, 2004).  
59 IMO, supra note 11, at para 121.  
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be interpreted by the Conference of the Parties (“COP”) and the COP serving as the Meeting 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (“CMP”), which are the competent bodies of the 
Protocol rather than any other body.60 China agreed that Articles 1 and 64 of the IMO 
Convention give the IMO competence in regulating the GHG issue, but underscored that the 
Kyoto Protocol is still “the most direct and authoritative” for such authorization.61 From the 
perspective of international law, China’s rebuttal on the interpretation of Article 2(2) of the 
Kyoto Protocol by the Legal Division of the IMO is persuasive in the sense that the IMO is 
not the competent organization for such interpretation.62 However, China’s argument on the 
relationship between the Kyoto Protocol and the IMO Convention in authorizing the IMO 
this regulatory work is lack of sufficient legal basis. This is because the Kyoto Protocol and 
the IMO Convention are two parallel treaties; it is thus unlikely to tell which treaty should 
prevail when there is a conflict between them.63 For this reason, it is not persuasive for China 
to claim that the Kyoto Protocol is the “most direct and authoritative” for the IMO’s work in 
regulating this GHG issue.64 
      Fourth, to apply the NMFT principle and exclude the application of the CBDR principle 
to the GHG issue would be unfair for developing countries. The largest share of GHG 
emissions from international shipping is attributed to the historical development of the 
shipping industry in developed countries,65 currently controlling the majority of the world 
deadweight tonnage.66 That is why the application of the NMFT principle would place the 
technologically disadvantaged developing countries in a worse position for development due 
to their lack of “survival emissions”.67  
                                                             
60 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, annex 9, p 2, IMO Doc MEPC 
58/23 (Oct. 16, 2008).  
61 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixtieth Session, annex 4, p 2, MEPC 60th 
Session, Agenda Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 60/22 (Apr. 12, 2010).  
62 Under international law, competent organizations to interpret a treaty include the treaty Parties, an ad hoc 
tribunal or the International Court conferred by the treaty, and the organs of the competent international 
organisation. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 630 (Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2008).  
63 Shi, supra note 37, at 85.  
64 However, it can be argued that the mandate that the IMO gets from the Kyoto Protocol is more specific than it 
gets from the IMO Convention. See id.   
65 Application of the Principle of "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities" to the Reduction of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions from International Shipping, para 4, submitted by China and India, MEPC 58th Session, Agenda 
Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/32 (Aug. 15, 2008).  
66 Id. at para 5.  
67 Id. at para 4. In this context, the “survival emissions” refer to the heavy reliance of many developing countries 
on necessary emissions associated with their shipping industry. See also Mark J. Mwandosya, Survival 
Emissions: A Perspective from the South on Global Climate Change Negotiations (2000).  
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      Fifth, as a response to a criticism that the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG 
issue would possibly make most ships exempt from the global reduction regulations due to 
the existence of Flag of Convenience (“FOC”),68 China asserted that this concern could be 
addressed. In China’s view, the beneficially-owned tonnage could be targeted in a way that 
was utilized by the Review of Maritime Transport by the UNCTAD, based on the data 
supplied by Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay.69 China suggested that the nationality of ships (flag 
State) be defined as the nationality of shipowners for the purpose of applying the CBDR 
principle in the context of GHG emissions from international shipping.70 In this way, the 
application of the CBDR principle would not seemingly make the ships, which are owned by 
the nationals of developed States but are flying the flags of developing States, be exempt from 
compulsory reduction commitments. However, shipowners may be companies or other 
business entities in law. It is thus possible that the nationals of developed States register 
their companies in developing States investing in ships so as to avoid the stringent 
regulations. China maintained that the CBDR principle should be applied to all three routes 
of reduction measures such as technical, operational measures and MBMs.71 In a broad sense 
the ‘differentiated responsibility’ element of the CBDR principle consists of the following 
three categories: (1) differentiated central obligations; (2) differentiated implementation 
arrangements; and (3) the granting of assistance including financial and technological 
assistance.72 China suggested all these three scenarios to the energy efficiency measures 
being discussed within the IMO, although two of these proposals have not got positive 
responses by other IMO member States. At the 61st MEPC meeting, China proposed that 
EEDI “should be mandatory to developed countries and voluntary to developing countries.”73 
This proposal reflects China’s interpretation on applying the CBDR principle to this GHG 
issue. That is to impose differentiated central obligations on various States. At the 62nd 
MEPC meeting, China proposed a phased-in approach for developing countries in 
                                                             
68. See Andrew Griffin, MARPOL 73/78 and Vessel Pollution: A Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 1(2) Ind. J. 
Global Legal Stud. 489-513, 506 (1994).  
69 Application of the Principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” to the Reduction of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions from International Shipping, para 5, submitted by China and India, MEPC 58th Session, Agenda 
Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/32 (Aug. 15, 2008).  
70 Id.  
71 Id. at para 7.  
72 Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law 191 (2006).  
73 Report of the Working Group on Energy Efficiency Measures for Ships, para 4.31, MEPC 61st Session, IMO 
Doc MEPC 61/WP.10 (Sept. 30, 2010).  
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implementing EEDI and SEEMP. 74  This approach belongs to the “differentiated 
implementation arrangement” element of the CBDR principle. However, neither of them was 
accepted by most countries. Under these circumstances, after the adoption of the revised 
MARPOL Annex VI, China turned to the last opportunity of partially incorporating the 
CBDR principle to the energy efficiency measures.75 The recognition of the CBDR principle 
was eventually written into the MEPC resolution on technical cooperation and transfer of 
technology. As a result, China was getting more enthusiastic to participating in related 
discussions under the guidance of the CBDR principle.76 Considering that many developed 
countries reserved their positions on this provision, however, whether the CBDR principle 
can be reflected in the implementation of this resolution is still doubted. 
      China has been a persistent opponent of MBMs to be applied to this GHG issue. However, 
China has suggested that, if a MBM is to be adopted, the CBDR principle should apply in a 
manner that “no extra financial responsibility” will be brought to developing countries.77 She 
proposed two principles to achieve this goal. First, the basic principles and key elements of 
MBMs should be determined by UNFCCC.78 Second, any funds generated from any MBM 
should be only provided to the shipping sector in developing countries.79 If comparing 
China’s claims with the current MBM proposals, it would not be straightforward to meet 
China’s proposal.  
 
B. Japan’s Perspective 
In comparison with these large developing countries like China and India which frequently 
reiterated their positions on the CBDR principle by lodging their statements to the IMO, 
Japan formally expressed its views on the regulatory principles for addressing GHG 
emissions from international shipping at the 58th and 59th MEPC meetings. First, Japan 
supported the role of the IMO in regulating the GHG issue asserting that there should be 
                                                             
74 Comments on the Proposed Mandatory Energy Efficiency Regulations, para 14, submitted by China, Saudi 
Arabia and South Africa, MEPC 62nd Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MEPC 62/5/10 (May 5, 2011).  
75For details, see Draft MEPC Resolution on Promotion of Technical Cooperation and Technology Transfer 
Relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of Ships, annex, submitted by Angola, Argentina, China, 
India, Jamaica, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa and Venezuela, MEPC 64th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc 
MEPC 64/4/30 (Jul. 27, 2012).  
76 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Fifth Session, annex 5, p 4, MEPC 65th 
Session, Agenda Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 65/22 (May 24, 2013).  
77 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-First Session, annex 3, p 3, MEPC 61st 
Session, Agenda Item 24, IMO Doc MEPC 61/24 (Oct. 6, 2010).  
78 Id. 
79 Id.  
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adherence to the NMFT principle.80 It supported the nine fundamental principles agreed at 
the 57th MEPC meeting.81 In view of strong opposition from many countries on the second 
principle (hereinafter NMFT principle), however, Japan, together with some other States, 
suggested an improved expression of this principle in order to reach consensus. It proposed 
that the future IMO framework should be “binding and equally applicable to all ships” rather 
than “binding and equally applicable to all flag States.”82 However, this proposal was not 
accepted by those delegations not supporting the second principle. 83  It was probably 
because this proposal still applied the NMFT principle, and thus was opposed by major 
developing countries, particularly major shipbuilding developing countries. Although these 
developing countries can flag their ships with FOC States, various regional Memoranda of 
Understanding (“MOUs”) on port State control will make it very difficult to operate and 
trade with substandard ships.84  
        Second, Japan supported the US view that “the IMO’s mandate on GHG emissions from 
shipping predates, and does not derive from the Kyoto Protocol.”85 Indeed, if this assertion is 
generally agreed, the CBDR principle will “[have] no place in the IMO.”86 However, this view 
has been supported by many developed countries, such as Norway, New Zealand, and 
Denmark.87  
      Third, Japan respects the CBDR principle applied in UNFCCC; she argued that the 
CBDR principle could be reflected in other ways including through technical cooperation in 
                                                             
80 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, annex 9, p 19, IMO Doc MEPC 
58/23 (Oct. 16, 2008).  
81 At the 57th MEPC meeting, the nine fundamental principles were agreed by “an overwhelming majority” but 
the second principle was opposed by some States. See Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee 
on Its Fifty-Seventh Session, para 4.77, MEPC 57th Session, Agenda Item 21, IMO Doc MEPC 57/21 (Apr. 7, 
2008).  
82 See Identifying Consensus on IMO Principles on Addressing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International 
Shipping, , MEPC 58th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MEPC 58/4/16 (Aug. 1, 2008).  
83 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Seventh Session, para 4.76, MEPC 57th 
Session, Agenda Item 21, IMO Doc MEPC 57/21 (Apr. 7, 2008).  
84 The MOUs on port State control have become a dominant means of facilitating effective port State control at 
the regional level. Currently there are nine MOUs. The reasons why regional MOUs have achieved rapid 
development include: the elimination of “port shopping”; improving inspection efficiency by means of 
harmonization between port States; and the reduction of the foreign ship’s burden of repetitive inspections. Ho-
Sam Bang, Is Port State Control an Effective Means to Combat Vessel-Source Pollution? An Empirical Survey 
of the Practical Exercise by Port States of their Powers of Control, 23 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 726 (2008). 
85 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, annex 9, pp 11, 19, IMO Doc 
MEPC 58/23 (Oct. 16, 2008).  
86 Id. at 10.  
87 Id.  
Page 15 of 20 
 
the regulation of the GHG issue.88 Compared to many other developed countries’ positions,89 
Japan’s view reveals its willingness of cooperation and compromise. As already discussed, 
based on a broad interpretation of the CBDR principle, an effective technical cooperation 
including the transfer of technology, in addition to financial assistance from developed 
countries to developing countries, could constitute a type of “differentiated responsibility” of 
the CBDR principle. In May 2013, however, the IMO adopted a resolution on Promotion of 
Technical Co-operation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy 
Efficiency of Ships, which in the preamble recognised both the CBDR and NMFT 
principles.90 Although the expressions utilize the words “being cognizant” to replace the 
proposed “acknowledging” by other countries, it was encouraging for most developing 
countries to expect more beneficial measures in facilitating the transfer of technologies as 
regulated in the amended Annex VI to the MARPOL.91 As a response to this adoption, Japan, 
together with Australia and the US, lodged a statement to the meeting report, which 
clarified that the CBDR principle applies in UNFCCC while the NMFT principle applies in 
the IMO and under the MARPOL 73/78.92 This statement indicates that Japan did not 
welcome the application of the CBDR principle to this issue from any perspective, although 
it asserted earlier at the 58th MEPC meeting that this principle could be reflected in certain 
ways. 
 
C. South Korea’s Perspective 
South Korea is a highly-developed shipbuilding country and has actively participated in the 
discussions on proposed technical, operational measures and MBMs within the IMO. At the 
61st MEPC meeting in 2011, South Korea asserted that the IMO is “the appropriate body to 
develop and enact regulations for emissions from international shipping.”93 
      Unlike its Chinese counterparts, the South Korean shipbuilding sector, in particular its 
                                                             
88 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, annex 9, p 19, IMO Doc MEPC 
58/23 (Oct. 16, 2008).  
89 See, e.g., the US asserted that the CBDR principle ‘has no place in the IMO’ and is inconsistent with the 
actions taken by the IMO. Id. at p 10.  
90 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Fifth Session, Annex 4, IMO Doc Res 
MEPC.229(65), p 1, MEPC 65th Session, Agenda Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 65/22 (May 24, 2013).  
91 MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI reg. 23.2.  
92 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Fifth Session, annex 5, p 3, MEPC 65th 
Session, Agenda Item 22, IMO Doc MEPC 65/22 (May 24, 2013).  
93  Comments on the Use of Credits of the Clean Development Mechanism in Market-based Measures for 
International Shipping, para 2, submitted by the Repbulic of Korea, MEPC 61st Session, Agenda Item 5, IMO 
Doc MEPC 61/5/28 (Aug. 6, 2010).  
Page 16 of 20 
 
large-sized shipbuilding companies, welcomes the planned unilateral actions by the EU to 
strengthening environmental regulations.94  South Korea’s large shipbuilders believe that 
they can gain more orders for constructing high-efficiency, eco-friendly ships once various 
EU technical, operational and market-based measures are in place.95 In contrast to the 
positive attitudes to reducing GHG emissions from ships by Korean shipping associations 
and large-sized shipbuilding companies, small and medium-sized shipping companies, 
however, are not so supportive of this kind of regulation. A survey in 2011 revealed that 
Korea’s small and medium-sized shipping firms were concerned that stricter environmental 
regulations on ships might further increase their manufacturing costs and weaken their price 
competitiveness, while their Chinese counterparts might not be influenced in this way.96 
Due to the existence of such a gap between different shipping firms, many small and 
medium-sized companies have not started their preparation for incorporating EEDI and 
SEEMP measures, 97  while large size companies have responded quickly to meet new 
requirements. E.g., HHI has been keen to develop its environmentally friendly high-value 
vessels, including drillships, liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) carriers, mega containerships, and 
those using LNG as a fuel.98 With this strategy, HHI has achieved remarkable success in 
getting new orders. 
      With regard to the CBDR principle, South Korea acknowledged it as a significant 
political matter which needs “deep consideration”; she pointed out that the matter would be 
addressed by ‘various options’99 Additionally, South Korea limited these ‘various options’ to 
“financial arrangement for technical cooperation and capacity building for less developed 
countries.”100 These expressions indicate that South Korea supported the application of the 
CBDR principle to GHG emissions issue based on its broad interpretation on the CBDR 
principle; it means that this principle could be applied to this GHG issue by the granting of 
                                                             
94  Asia Shipbuilding & Offshore Information Service (ASIASIS), Korea Welcomes EU Environmental 
Regulations (17 November 2010), available at http://www.simic.net.cn/news_show.php?lan=en&id=80211 (last 
visited on Sept. 28, 2014).  
95 Id.  
96 Sang-Yoon Lee and Young-Tae Chang, Shipping Companies' Awareness and Preparedness for Greenhouse 
Gas Regulations: A Korean Case in Theo Notteboom (ed), Current Issues in Shipping, Ports and Logistics 25-
50, 47 (2011).  
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98 Lee, supra note 35.  
99 Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, annex 9, p 12, IMO Doc MEPC 
58/23 (Oct. 16, 2008).  
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financial assistance and technical cooperation to developing countries. At the 61st MEPC 
meeting, South Korea asserted that the IMO is the appropriate body to regulate GHG 
emissions from international shipping “with harmonization” between the CBDR principle 
and the NMFT principle.101 It can be inferred that South Korea supported the application of 
both the CBDR and NMFT principles to the GHG issue, although her interpretation on the 
CBDR principle is different from that of China. South Korea has not explicitly expressed its 
views on the origin of the IMO’s mandate. However, it supported the nine fundamental 
principles adopted by the 57th MEPC meeting.102 The incorporation of the NMFT principle 
into the second principle reveals South Korea’s support for applying the NMFT principle to 
GHG emissions from ships. This position makes South Korea distinct from many other 
UNFCCC non-Annex I States, such as Brazil, South Africa and India.  
 
D. A Comparative Assessment 
China, Japan and South Korea all support the leading role of the IMO in regulating technical 
and operational measures to reduce shipping GHG emissions. They all agree the role of the 
CBDR principle in the global climate change regime, i.e., a regime under UNFCCC and its 
Kyoto Protocol. However, their views towards the IMO’s role in regulating MBMs and the 
application of the CBDR principle to GHG emissions issue are divergent. 
       While China doubted the IMO’s competence in regulating MBMs and asserted that this 
work should be determined by UNFCCC, both Japan and South Korea supported the IMO’s 
role in regulating MBMs. The NMFT principle is the real ground behind the different 
positions of these countries. Since it is open to debate whether the Kyoto Protocol is the sole 
mandate that the IMO has received so far in regulating GHG emissions issue, it becomes 
reasonable for countries to interpret Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol to meet their 
regulatory interests. If Chinese argument on the IMO’s competence is accepted by most IMO 
member States, the NMFT principle will not be applied to the proposed MBMs in further 
regulating this GHG issue. Considering their comparative advantages in energy efficient 
technologies, nevertheless, the shipping industries in Japan and South Korea would be less 
negatively affected by the increased transportation cost due to possible adoption of MBMs 
                                                             
101 Comments on the Use of Credits of the Clean Development Mechanism in Market-based Measures for 
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102 See, e.g., Report of the Third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
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than that in China.103 Table 1 provides the divergent views of China, Japan, South Korea and 
their shipping industries on the regulation of GHG emissions from international shipping.  
 
Table 1. Positions of China, Japan, South Korea and their shipping industries on the regulation of 
























China support oppose support oppose oppose 
Chinese shipping 
industry 
support oppose support oppose oppose 
Japan support support oppose support unknown 
Japanese shipping 
industry 
support support oppose support unknown 





support support unknown support support 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
The shipping industries in China and South Korea have opposite views on possible unilateral 
actions by the EU. The EU generally launches its unilateral actions when the regulatory 
process of competent international organizations is slow, and these unilateral actions are 
usually more stringent than the proposals being discussed within the international 
organization. 104  For this reason, these different views from Chinese and South Korean 
shipping industries probably reveal that under proposed IMO regulations the 
technologically-advantaged Korean shipping industry would be more competitive when 
compared to its Chinese competitors. Although Japan’s shipping industry has pioneered 
most energy efficient shipping technologies, it remains unclear whether she supports 
possible unilateral actions by the EU.105 
                                                             
103 Council Working Party on Shipbuilding, supra note 20, at 29.  
104  For example, in January 2012 the EU included the emissions from international aviation into the EU 
Emission Trading Scheme due to slow progress within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
This unilateral action significantly increased the cost of many airlines and was thus opposed by many countries. 
Consequently this policy suspended in December 2012. In October 2013, an EU proposal on its unilateral ETS 
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Relevant to Emissions from Fuel Used for International Aviation and Maritime Transport, Executive Summary, 
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105 For details, see Anuradha, R.V., “Unilateral Measures and Climate Change” (Centre for WTO Studies, IIFT 
Bhawan, May 25, 2012) , 11, available at 
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        China has continuously supported the application of the CBDR principle to GHG 
emissions from ships. Although China interpreted this principle as differentiated central 
obligations between developed countries and developing countries, China also attempted to 
apply other options to partially adopt the principle. They are differentiated implementation 
arrangement and the granting of financial assistance and transfer of technology. Compared 
with China, Japan opposed the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG issue from any 
perspective. Actually, this comparison reflects the conflict between major developing and 
developed countries as to approaches of appropriately balancing equity and fairness in 
combating climate change; today there is a trend of weakening the CBDR principle in global 
climate change negotiations.106 
      While China supported the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG issue rather 
than the NMFT principle, South Korea welcomed the application of both principles in this 
regard. In addition to their different views towards the NMFT principle, the divergence of 
China and South Korea also lies in their differing interpretation of the CBDR principle. To 
some extent, the CBDR principle that South Korea interpreted is not the same one that 
China understood. This indicates that there are differing regulatory interests between States 
which are not listed under Annex I to UNFCCC. Aside from large developing countries 
which are also main importing countries, main FOC States, least developed countries and 
small-island developing States all have differentiated regulatory interests.107 Such difference 
determines that these UNFCCC non-Annex I States take differentiated positions on this 
CBDR issue.  
      In comparison to Japan’s opposition to the application of the CBDR principle to the GHG 
issue, South Korea adopted a “conditional” recognition of this principle. Although both Japan 
and South Korea are the members of OECD, their different legal affiliations under the Kyoto 
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20, 2011); Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its 58th Session, annex 9, Statement by 
the Delegation of Vanuatu, p 21, IMO Doc MEPC 58/23 (Oct. 16, 2008).  
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The international community has a goal of limiting an increase of two degrees Celsius in the 
global average temperature by 2100 in tackling climate change.108 However, a recent report 
by the Asian Development Bank reveals that an increase of two degrees Celsius by 2050 is 
“almost unavoidable”109 Compared with the average of 1961-1990, mean temperatures will be 
1.9-2.6 degrees Celsius higher across the East Asian region in 2050 and 3.8-5.2 degrees 
Celsius higher in 2090.110 Owing to the significant contributions of China, Japan and South 
Korea to global climate change,111 it is vital for these three countries to ensure the compliance 
of their ships with the adopted energy efficiency measures. Nevertheless, EEDI has had and 
will continue to have more negative impacts on Chinese shipbuilding industry than on the 
shipping industries in Japan and South Korea; the Index may even “trigger another migration 
of shipbuilding industry in the future.”112 It will thus be more important for China to secure 
the incorporation of the CBDR principle in certain ways as to future improvement of the 
EEDI and SEEMP, as well as future adoption of MBMs.  
As discussed throughout this paper, the differentiated perspectives of these three 
countries on the regulation of GHG emissions issue generally reflect their differing 
regulatory interests. Therefore, it is significant to take their differentiated interests into 
account in the developing regulatory regime to avoid disproportionate burdens being placed 
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